This article is more than 5 years old. Information may no longer be current.
Custodial rights of the criminally accused: Miranda v Arizona
Click Here to Manage Email Alerts
While medical negligence is often of immediate interest to clinicians, criminal prosecution of the medical profession is on the rise, as the federal government steps up its efforts in this regard. In this column, we previously commented on the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright in 1963; that case set forth the requirement that state courts must provide legal counsel for criminal defendants who cannot afford their own attorney. Here, we examine another landmark ruling of the United States Supreme Court from the 1960s that, like Gideon, set forth important civil protections that are fundamental to our democratic system and that proscribe the power of the state over the individual.
On November 27, 1962, a young woman left the First National Bank of Arizona, and was robbed by a male suspect at knife-point after he forced his way into her car. Four months later, the same suspect abducted an 18-year-old girl, again at knife-point and, after tying her hands and feet, drove to a secluded area of the desert and raped her.
On March 13, 1963, police arrested 23-year-old laborer named Ernesto Arturo Miranda as a suspect in both crimes. Miranda was no stranger to police; he had a prior arrest record for armed robbery and a juvenile record of crime. Miranda’s arrest and subsequent conviction on kidnapping, rape and armed robbery charges would set in motion legal proceedings that would end in a landmark decision by the Supreme Court.
B. Sonny Bal
Lawrence H. Brenner
Miranda was arrested at his home and taken to the police station, where he was identified by the complaining witness, and underwent interrogation by two police officers for 2 hours, ending with his signed confession. The confession included the typed statement, “I do hereby swear that I make this statement voluntarily and of my own free will, with no threats, coercion or promises of immunity, and with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me.”
At no time during his interrogation was Miranda told of his right to counsel, and he was not advised of his right to remain silent or that his statements would be used against him. At trial, when prosecutors brought up the written confession as evidence, Miranda’s court-appointed lawyer, Alvin Moore, objected that the confession was not voluntary and should be excluded. Moore’s objection was overruled, and based on this confession and other evidence, Miranda was convicted of rape and kidnapping and sentenced to 20 years to 30 years imprisonment on each charge, with sentences to run concurrently.
Moore filed an appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court claiming that Miranda’s confession was improperly admitted into the court proceedings. The Arizona Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s decision to admit the confession, noting that Miranda had never specifically requested an attorney during or before his questioning. Moore filed an appeal with the United States Supreme Court on grounds that Miranda’s constitutional rights had been violated.
The right against self-incrimination
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is part of the Bill of Rights, guards against abuse of government authority in a legal proceeding. Its guarantees can be traced to English common law and the Magna Carta of 1215. The Fifth Amendment states that: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
Whether a crime is “infamous” as stipulated in the words of the Fifth Amendment depends on the nature of the punishment that may be imposed, rather than the punishment that is imposed. In United States v. Moreland (1922), the Supreme Court held that incarceration in a prison or penitentiary, as opposed to a correction or reformation house, attaches infamy to a crime. Legal scholars agree that an infamous crime is one that is punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year, i.e., crimes that fit the modern definition of felonies.
In his appeal, Miranda invoked the Fifth Amendment’s protection of witnesses from being forced to incriminate themselves. Torture and forced confession were commonly used prosecutorial tools in the late 16th century and early 17th century England. Suspected Puritans, for example, were coerced to take an oath swearing their innocence, and then tortured to reveal the names of other Puritans. As Puritans fled to the New World, they began rebelling against forced interrogations. Subsequent legal reforms included “The Humble Petition of Many Thousands” before Parliament in 1647 that demanded, among other things, the right against self-incrimination in criminal cases. These protections were brought to America by the Puritans, and were later incorporated into the United States Constitution through the Bill of Rights.
The Decision in Miranda v Arizona
Miranda was a split decision; by a 5-4 margin, the court voted to overturn Miranda’s conviction. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren declared that the burden is upon the state to demonstrate that “procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination” are followed. Where a suspect is in police isolation, interrogation of the suspect is at odds with the principle that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself. Miranda was the first of several related cases heard by the court; Warren’s opening sentence said “The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime.”
Warren wrote, “It is clear that Miranda was not in any way apprised of his right to consult with an attorney and to have one present during the interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled to incriminate himself effectively protected in any other manner. Without these warnings [his] statements were inadmissible. The mere fact that he signed a statement which contained a typed-in clause stating that he had ‘full knowledge’ of his ‘legal rights’ does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights.”
Warren then spelled out the rights of the accused and the responsibilities of the police. Police must warn a suspect “prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” These words enunciated four constitutional protections of criminal defendants in police custody; these would stand the test of time and become part of American legal and Hollywood crime film folklore. In fact, for years after this ruling, police officers around the country carried a cheat sheet of this disclosure inside their caps, to be read to defendants at the time of arrest.
Miranda then and today
The creation of the Miranda warning put on the shoulders of the police the burden of informing citizens subject to questioning in a criminal investigation of their rights to due process. After the Supreme Court ruling, Miranda retracted his confession, was tried again by the state of Arizona, found guilty and sent to prison. His retrial, based on a prisoner’s successful appeal, did not constitute “double jeopardy” according to the court. Miranda spent 11 years in jail and then was on parole for a few years, selling personally autographed Miranda cards. In 1976, he was stabbed to death during a violent altercation. Interestingly, his killer was questioned by police using a card labeled, “Miranda Rights”; the suspect did not confess and fled to Mexico after police released him.
The Miranda warning that originated in 1963 was recently in the news when Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was interrogated as a suspect in the Boston Marathon bombings for several hours in his hospital room before U.S. Magistrate Judge Marianne Bowler told him that he did not have to answer questions and that he could have a lawyer. Reportedly, Tsarnaev told interrogators about his role in the Boston bombings and a related plan to set off explosives in New York. If prosecutors decide to use this information against Tsarnaev in legal proceedings, the civil protections set forth by Miranda will be triggered, just as they would if a physician, for example, were accused by federal prosecutors of crime related to improper Medicare billing or illicit surgeon-industry relations, and questioned about these matters.
The aftermath of Miranda
Later judicial decisions clarified the scope of Miranda, and some rulings narrowed the protections set forth by that decision. In general, however, Miranda stands as a constitutional principle. In 1984, for example, the court said that Miranda warnings were not necessary when the police seek information reasonably prompted by a concern for public safety. Thus, police may question a suspect about the location of a gun and then use that evidence against him in court, absent a Miranda warning. This exception could, in fact, be invoked by prosecutors in the case against Tsarnaev, if the suspect raises his Miranda rights. Prosecutors will argue that public safety demanded immediate questioning of the suspect, in the hopes of identifying any other explosives and threats that might have compromised public safety.
The Miranda protection against self-incrimination is not unique to the United States. Similar protections are captured in Section 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In other Commonwealth of Nations, countries like Australia and New Zealand, the right to silence of the accused both during questioning and at trial is regarded as an important right inherited from common law and is protected in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, and in Australia through various federal and state acts and codes governing the criminal justice system. In contrast, in nations like India and Saudi Arabia, police beatings of suspects in custody and forcing written confessions continue to make regular media coverage.
What do you think?
- Do you agree that dangerous criminals must be forced to talk, rather than rely on legal protections and further jeopardize public safety, especially in egregious cases of crime where guilt is self-evident?
- Do silence and the demand to consult counsel suggest guilt in any way?
- Miranda was a split decision. The dissent believed that Miranda was a veteran criminal who was familiar with police interrogation and could easily have remained silent or asked for counsel, but chose to confess instead. If so, should Miranda rights of the criminally-accused be waived in such circumstances?
- Should Miranda warnings apply to the questioning of suspected terrorists in military tribunals?
Discuss with your colleagues at www.OrthoMind.com.
For more information:
Disclosures: Bal and Brenner have no relevant financial disclosures.